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THE VANGUARD GROUP, INC.; LIQUIDHUB, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-02898) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 22, 2014 
 
Before: JORDAN, SCIRICA and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 







 Raymond Farzan, proceeding pro se, appeals orders of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants in his employment discrimination action.  We will affirm. 
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Farzan was born in 1950 in Iran, and is a Muslim of Arab descent.  In 2011, he 
was hired as a temporary employee by LiquidHub, an information technology consulting 
company, to work as a senior business systems analyst (BSA) on a project run by the 
Vanguard Group (Vanguard), an investment management company.  After approximately 
three months, Farzan’s supervisor at Vanguard, Joseph Corcoran, notified LiquidHub that 
he was dissatisfied with Farzan’s work.  Over the next several weeks, a LiquidHub client 
manager, Jeffrey Fountaine, made several efforts to improve Farzan’s performance, but 
Corcoran ultimately concluded that Farzan did not meet the standards expected from a 
senior-level BSA.  Consequently, Corcoran terminated Farzan from his assignment, and 
advised LiquidHub of the decision.  Because there were no other opportunities available 
for Farzan at the time, LiquidHub terminated his employment.  Farzan’s position was 
temporarily filled by a 27 year-old white female who was already employed by 
Vanguard. 
Farzan filed a complaint in the United States District Court, alleging that 
LiquidHub and Vanguard discriminated against him based on his race, religion, gender, 
national origin, and age, and retaliated against him for complaining about the 
discrimination.  He brought his claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).  Following discovery, the defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment.  The District Court granted those motions.  See Farzan v. Vanguard 
Group, Inc., -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2014 WL 116252 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2014) (granting 
Vanguard’s motion for summary judgment).  Farzan appealed.   
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and view all inferences drawn from the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Montone v. City of 
Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is proper only if the 
record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
The District Court properly analyzed Farzan’s discrimination and retaliation 
claims according to the familiar burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 
F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 
1996) (holding PHRA claims can be treated coextensively with Title VII and ADEA 
claims).  Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Farzan bore the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
802.  If he succeeded, the burden would shift to the defendants to “articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for his termination.  See id.  Farzan would then 
have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate 
reason for his termination offered by the defendants was a pretext.  See Jones, 198 F.3d at 
410.   
Here, even if Farzan had established a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
defendants articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination.  
Vanguard provided evidence indicating that Farzan did not perform at the level required 
4 
 
of a senior BSA.1  See Ross v. Gilhuly, 75 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that 
“demonstrably poor job performance” qualifies as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for termination).  Vanguard’s dissatisfaction with Farzan’s performance provided a 
legitimate reason for LiquidHub to terminate him.  Indeed, when a client removes a 
temporary LiquidHub employee from a project due to dissatisfaction, LuquidHub’s usual 
practice is to fire that employee.2   
Farzan has not produced a material issue of fact demonstrating that the defendants’ 
proffered reasons for firing him were a pretext for discrimination.  To establish pretext 
under the summary judgment standard, a plaintiff must either (1) offer evidence that 
“casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so 
that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication,” or (2) 
present evidence sufficient to support an inference that “discrimination was more likely 
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.”  Fuentes 
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994).  To meet that burden, a plaintiff “cannot 
simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken.”  Id. at 765. 
                                              
1 For example, Farzan’s mentor indicated that Farzan failed to adequately prepare for and 
lead meetings.  A business manager working with Farzan stated that his work was at 
times inaccurate and incomplete, and that he often failed to take the lead during project 
meetings, as was his responsibility.  A manager of a project that Farzan was working on 
reported that he had missed meetings and was not adhering to the project’s schedule.   
 
2 Farzan claims that he was a full-time employee of LiquidHub.  Farzan’s classification is 
not material, however, because, even in the case of a “Full-time Salaried Associate,” 
LiquidHub’s practice is to determine on a case-by-case basis whether termination is 
warranted when a client dismisses an associate from an assignment.  Vanguard’s 
dissatisfaction with Farzan’s performance, whether he was a temporary or full-time 
employee, provided a legitimate reason for LiquidHub to terminate him.  
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Farzan attempted to cast doubt on the defendants’ proffered reasons for 
terminating him by noting that Corcoran had complimented his “good progress” in an 
email dated March 28, 2012.  That isolated instance of positive feedback does not 
undermine the otherwise consistent criticism of Farzan’s performance.  Ezold v. Wolf, 
Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Pretext is not 
established by virtue of the fact that an employee has received some favorable comments 
in some categories or has, in the past, received some good evaluations.”).  Farzan also 
asserted that the defendants’ proffered reasons for terminating him are suspect because he 
was not made aware of his poor performance through a formal evaluation.3  As the 
District Court explained, however, “the lack of such an evaluation . . . does not make the 
reasons unworthy of belief.”  Farzan, 2014 WL 116252, at *5.  Moreover, on several 
occasions Farzan was informally notified that his work needed improvement, see Kautz 
v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “[e]vidence that the 
method of evaluation an employer used was not the best method does not amount to 
evidence that the method was so implausible, inconsistent, incoherent or contradictory 
that it must be a pretext for something else”), and the defendants took steps to help 
Farzan meet the job’s requirements.  Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 
1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff failed to show that defendant’s reason 
                                              
 
3 To the extent that Farzan challenges the District Court’s denial of his letter request for 
additional discovery material, including information related to the defendants’ evaluation 
procedures, we discern no abuse of discretion.  See Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, 
46 F.3d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying “abuse of discretion standard when 
reviewing orders regarding the scope and conduct of discovery.”).    
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for firing her was pretextual where, inter alia, defendant “provided her with numerous 
opportunities to rectify her behavior.”).  To the extent that Farzan claims that he 
performed adequately, the District Court properly held that his disagreement with the 
critical feedback does not demonstrate pretext.  See Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 
812, 825 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The fact that an employee disagrees with an employer’s 
evaluation of him does not prove pretext.”).     
The District Court also properly held that Farzan failed to demonstrate that his 
termination was motived by invidious discriminatory reasons.  In support of his 
argument, Farzan noted that he was the only Iranian and Muslim in Corcoran’s group.  
But “[b]ecause no conclusion can be drawn from [Farzan’s] raw numbers on 
underrepresentation, they are not probative of [the defendants’] alleged discriminatory 
motive.”  Ezold, 983 F.3d at 543.  Furthermore, although Farzan emphasized that he was 
not provided with adequate training or equipment to handle a heavy workload, the 
evidence fails to establish that similarly situated employees not within the protected class 
were treated more favorably.  See Jones, 198 F.3d at 413 (holding that a plaintiff may 
support an assertion that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a 
determinative cause by showing that “the employer has treated more favorably similarly 
situated persons not within the protected class.”); see also Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 
480 F.3d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that employee’s subjective belief that her 
workload was greater than other similarly situated employees was insufficient to establish 
disparate treatment).  Farzan also notes that he was replaced by a 27 year-old woman.  
This fact helps establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, but, without more, it 
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does not demonstrate that the defendants’ decision to terminate Farzan for poor 
performance was pretextual.  See Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 529 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming entry of summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff “present[ed] no 
evidence, other than her replacement by a younger woman, indicating [defendant’s] 
proffered reasons for her termination were a pretext for age discrimination.”).  Farzan 
further sought to demonstrate a discriminatory motive by relying on various comments 
made to him by Vanguard employees.  For reasons thoroughly explained by the District 
Court, however, we agree that these comments are immaterial because they were either 
not directed at Farzan, not uttered by decisionmakers, or, even viewed in the light most 
favorable to Farzan, not indicative of discriminatory animus.4  See Farzan, 2014 WL 
116252, at *7-8; see also Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 
1997) (stating that when evaluating whether comments are probative of discrimination, 
courts should consider the relationship of the speaker to the employee and within the 
corporate hierarchy, the temporal proximity of the statement to the adverse employment 
decision, and the purpose and content of the statement); Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 767 
(recognizing that “[s]tray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by decisionmakers unrelated 
to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made 
temporally remote from the date of decision.”). 
                                              
4 We also agree that these comments are insufficient to establish a hostile work 
environment claim.  See Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(stating that “offhanded comments and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) are 
not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim.  Rather, the conduct must be 
extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.”)          
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Finally, the District Court properly rejected Farzan’s retaliation claim.  To 
establish a prima facie claim of unlawful retaliation, Farzan was required to show that: 
(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendants took an adverse action against 
him; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
action taken.  Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006).  Farzan 
claimed that he was fired because he threatened to file a complaint “if something 
happened to [his] job.”  Importantly, however, Farzan failed to demonstrate that a 
decisionmaker at Liquidhub was aware of any protected activity in which he may have 
engaged.  See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 883 n.6 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that “[i]f the decisionmakers were completely unaware of the plaintiff’s protected 
activity, then it could not be said . . . that the decisionmakers might have been retaliating 
against the plaintiff for having engaged in that activity.”).  In addition, although Farzan 
told a Vanguard employee that he would file a complaint if he was fired, he did “not 
explicitly or implicitly allege” that he was experiencing discrimination.  Barber v. CSX 
Distrib. Serv., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. 
of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that “it must be 
possible to discern from the context of the statement that the employee opposes an 
unlawful employment practice.”).   
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
